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Michael Shorrland and Lisa Lentini
No field of literature has been so poorly cultivated as the autobiography,
Herbert Read once wrote, and none so bereft of unquestionable masterpieces. I
Bereft of masterpieces? Had Read perhaps forgotten Augustine, Montaigne,
Rousseau, Goethe, Stendhal and Tolstoy? And what of Casanova, Petrarch,
Cellini, Berlioz and Gide? This must surely have been a momentary lapse on
Read's part, or had he good reason to pa"s over such a weal th ofgood, masterly,
writing? In fact, a" John Pilling has recently pointed out, Read had no reason
at all, or at least offered none.2
Our suspicion is that Herbert Read, never the most synthetic of critics, was
barned and disappointed by the very range of literary autobiography, a range
which makes it at once ubiquitous and unclassifiable. Literary criticism has
often approached books as Linneaus did flowers and insects, with a mind to
ordering them (that is, in terms familiar to us from Michel Foucault's Order of
Things, with a will to power). A genre that encompasses such unruly species
as Sartre's Les Mots, Yeats's Reveries Over Childhood and Youth, and
Darwin's Autobiography is sure to make mockery of any easy schemes of
classification. Such books perhaps belong in the literary equivalcntofLinneaus'
category 'Chaos' (into which he put amoeba) or perhaps 'Cryptomania' (the
home of ferns, mosses and fungi).
Making sense of autobiographies by finding a home for them in some
classification, or in the canon, is not, I think, a very useful approach, although
it does serve the function of drawing attention to some much-neglected
writing. (If Herbert Read has said that no field has been so poorly cultivated
as autobiographical criticism, he would have been closer to the truth). What is
useful, atlcast as a first step, is to undersumd what autobiographies do, what
work they perform, and how. In this article we examine three autobiographies
written by scientists. Some may be surprised to learn that Charles Darwin,
Sigmund Freud and Albert Einstein wrote about themselves at all, still less that
they did so interestingly. The reason has been spelt out with his usual
forthrightness by the eminent biochemist Erwin Chargaff, who wrote in 1968
that the scientific autobiography belongs to a 'most awkward literary genre',
whose practitioners typically lead 'monotonous and uneventful lives' and
typically offer 'the account of a career, not of a life'.3 Chargaff added that the
career is likely to lack compelling interest because, by contrast to the arts, 'it
is not the men that make science; it is the science that makes the men.' Without
Milton, in other words, we would have no Paradise Lost, but Newton's
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celestial mcchanics would eventually have been supplied by others.
Chargaffs observations appeared in a review of James D. Watson's The
Double Helix (a scientist he strongly disliked). Despite Chargaffs antipathy
to Watson, we cannot dismiss his comments about the lack of personality in
scientific autobiography. Broad, though indircct, support for his views seems
to prevail in the work of professional science-watchers. In a review of a book
on the psychology and style of science, the physicist and historian of science
Gerald Holton enumerates what he calls 'the main features that define
scientific style as commonly understood at present':
In written work, 'the individual traces of the personal self
[should) be attenuated as far as that can be done'.
2 Scientists should 'be logical, not emotional .... Mere opinions,
preferences, emotions, and instincts must be repressed'.
3 'Errors or unlikely hypotheses are to be avoided at all costs.'
4 'The dcsircd outcomc is the simple, notthc complcx.'
5 'As with the content of science itsclf, the setting in which one
does onc's science is ideally as removed from interpersonal
disputes as possible. '4
Holton's five points strongly suggcstthat science is an activity hostile to the
assertion, or the discovery, of a personal self. If the style of science moulds the
scientist as a person, that by itself is enough to account for the faults Chargaff
finds in scientific autobiography.
How do we recognise thc selfof an autobiographer? Sometimes the author
tells us something personal that we feel is both important and accurate. Often
we get cues from omissions, or from discrepancies between the author's
expressed feelings about an incident and our own reactions to it We notice
excess, reticence, and inconsistency, just as we do to those qualities in certain
works of fiction - with the difference that in fiction their presence is deliberate
whereas in autobiography they are mostly unintended. As with fiction, we
amass cues in pursuit of a thcory of the whole that accords with our sense of
the narratorand of the world that the narrator has arranged in the serviceofsel f-
explanation.
If one accepts the definition of self offered by critics of the autobiographi-
cal genre, the scientific autobiography not only fails to present such a self but
even breaks the cardinal rule of all autobiography, namely to focus attention
on the self. After all, it is widely accepted that the autobiography should by its
very nature be a subjective, confessional account of the author's experiences.
So keen are some commentators on this definition of autobiography lhallhey
promptly designate all scientific autobiography 'memoir' and thus dismiss it
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entirely.
This is an unfortunate response, in that it defines scientific autobiography
according to standards by which it is found lacking. We hope to show that,
whilst most scientific autobiographies have indeed sought to efface self, to
deaden the subjective impulse, this tendency is the result of a particular set of
historical circumstances. Since the conditions that produced self-effacing
autobiography no longer prevail, the possibility now exists for scientists to
begin writing renectivel y,or reminiscing criticalIy on, their role in their work.
They may now restore the 'I' in science.
Self-Effacing Autobiography?
The first piece ofevidence that the scientific autobiography renects particular
scientific-historical circumstances is that the genre only emerged in the late
nineteenth century. The second is that only certain kinds of scientist left any
autobiographical trace. Such scientists had often been marginalised by the
scientific establishment due to geographical remoteness, class, unorthodox
training or subject specialism. As a result, scientific autobiographies have
served first and foremost to defend, or at least to voice, a series of territorial,
individual and scientific claims. Most often, they were written to show that
provincial scientific culture can generate valuable results or that the non-
physical sciences can produce valid knowledge. That scientific autobiogra-
phies were essentialIy promotional exercises becomes easier to appreciate
when we consider the shape and structure of the early ninetccnth century
scientific establishment (which was still in place when late nineteenth century
autobiographers began their reminiscences).
The prevailing image today is thatofa powerful, welI-entrenched and welI-
policed scientific establishment, one that speaks, for the most part, with a
united voice. Whether a scientist works in Oxford, New York or Sydney,
studying bones, bal<;, or bacteria, his or her work is a<;sumed to be based on an
established scientific method, a groundwork of accepted scientific laws and
rigorous procedures for colIecting and using evidence. In a word, scientists
work in a paradigm, which binds them together into a community,just as other
sets of beliefs and modes of behaviour solder people together into religious
groups or political parties. But things were not always this way in science: the
power and hegemony that science now wields has only recently been estab-
lished.
Throughout much of the last century, and in some respects welI into our
own, the so-called scientific community existed only in name: scientists were
divided into sects and factions that vied for power, access to eminentjoumals
and research funding. Disputes nared over the very essentials of science, over
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what science was and who could pursue it. Such disputes came to centre on
claims to scientific objectivity, and by the end of the nineteenth century,
objectivity (defined as a rough-and-ready synonym for rationality, truthful-
ness and science itself) came to be the prize. For the physical scientist trained
ata recogniscd university, scientific objectivity was a quickly-acquired badge
of the profession: in researching the material world, he could claim, he was not
only adhering to a well-established tradition reaching back to the days of
Newton, Descartes and Boyle, but also abjuring any prejudice and bias. How
could interpretations of inert matter - atoms, planets, falling apples - be
coloured by metaphysical beliefs or any other ideology? Moreover, the
physicist and chemist could, and often did, assert that a university training
ensured mastery of the appropriate techniques of observation, theorising and
sound reasoning.
On both these counts, the bulk of nineteenth century scientific autobiogra-
phers fall short. For one thing, they did not study dead matter but living forms.
For another, they were rarely products of the conventional academic mill or
metropolitan apprenticeship. For life scientists there was no noble tradition
harking back to the golden age ofearly-modem science, only a history of false
leads, failed experiments and patent absurdities. The pressure on these mar-
ginal scientists to justify their labours was intense, and when they came to look
back on their scientific careers, they felt impelled once again to asscrt theirjust
claim to the status of objective scientist. This they did in several ways, each of
which sheds light on the nature of self in science and the imperatives of
scientific conformity.
How did the marginal scientist of living beings deal with this uncomfort-
able predicament? One way was to pen an autobiography professing honesty
and modesty. The formidable T.H. Huxley - Darwin's Bulldog as he was
known - offers a case in point. His autobiogmphy is composed around the
refrain 'I do not lie and have no reason to err'.5 So sternly docs Huxley abide
by this dictum - that is, wish to be seen to abide by it - that he denies his
autobiography is a work of imaginative composition at all. It simply mirrors
reality, without artifice or literary conceit. A nice enough rhetorical gesture,
but one that wears thin pretty quickly,as do his repeated claims of modesty and
common sense. But there is one sense in which Huxley's ploy deserves
attention. Though some autobiogmphers are liars and many misinterpret
themselves, it is in their interest to claim to tell the truth. Nevertheless, Huxley
offers a reminder that scientific autobiographers do this more insistently than
other memoir writers. More importantly, they doso for specific reasons thatse(
them apart from, say,literary autobiographers. Rousseau, for example, prom-
ises to tell us in his Confessions the 'naked unblushing truth'.6 He docs so, it
is clear, to elevate his own status and our respect for him. When Huxley docs
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the same, it is notlO assurc us of his sincerity but to convince us oflhc validity
and correClnCSS of his science. Rousseau wanlS approbation for himself;
Huxley wants it for his science.
In laying claim to objectivity, furthermore, the writer of scientific autobi-
ography pUrpoflS to abjure all literary conceilS, so that the work seems quite
withoutarlor artifice. Herbert Spencer reiterates throughout his autobiography
how 'plain', hence 'natural', is his work and how link his life has been touched
by the reading of novels. He presents himself as a kind of anaesthetic man,
inventing nothing, knowing nothing, recording al1.7
These two methods function in the scientific autobiography to distinguish
it from other types of memoir-writing. But it is a third method that most
effectively serves the appcaranceofobjectivity and emphasises the dissimilar-
ity betwccn this and other forms of literature: the scientific autobiographer
distances himself, asa subject, so fully from his objects ofstudy that he effaces
himself totally. Leaving aside for a moment the reasons why he might wish to
do this, let us tum first to the question of how he does so. The first procedure
is to dissociate the subject from the process of scientific investigation.
Sensitive to the criticism thal, in examining living beings, one is naturally
tempted to bring values, preconceptions and prejudices to the task, the scientist
responds by denying his own role in scientific investigation. This denial neatly
deOeclS the second criticism - that the scientist may lack the training to
recognise laws and generate hypotheses and lO apply the true scientific
method. Even eminent ninetccnth century life scientists, in other words, seem
to be denying their own contributions - the contributions that prompted their
autobiographical endeavours in the first place.
Darwin Speaks from the Grave
Charles Darwin, the most renowned biologist of the ninetccnth century, left
behind an autobiography. Darwin, one might think, had linle to fear for his
science. With honours upon honours and a worldwide reputation, it seems
incredible that Darwin at the end of his life wrote an autobiography clearly
intended lO minimize his own creative contribution to the process and progress
of science.
Many impulses sustained (and were sustained by) such self-effacement.
Darwin tells us, for one thing, that he was never very intelligent or far-seeing
- mediocre at school and university, generally slightly dull. Other scientific
autobiographers also adopt this affectation, even when it is patently false:
Francis Galton, for example, even though he did spectacularly well in his early
education and at Cambridge. To begin with, we are told that the subject has not
applied much intelligence to scientific work. Then we are informed that he has
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not brought much imagination either. Darwin tells us how he gradually lost all
aesthetic sense, all enjoyment of poetry and literature, how he became 'like a
man who is colour blind'. In fact - and this is the crucial organising device
running through his Autobiography (1876. first printed in 1887) - Darwin is
merely a humble, avid, greedy collector of facts.8
Here is the key, it seems, both to how the book is constructed and to the
purpose it serves. To stake his claim to scientific objectivity - at a time when
the theory of evolution was decried as a law of higgledy-piggledy, a vague
hypothesis lacking evidential basis - Darwin wants to present us with a natural
world teeming with life, an animated, jumbled confusion of varieties, species,
beasts and plants. Darwin portrays himself as approaching this panorama with
the emotional blankness ofa collector ofevidence devoid ofexpectation, prior
knowledge or subjectivity. Working, he says, on pure Baconian principles, 'I
collected facts without theory on a wholesale scale', adding that 'my mind has
become a kind of machine for grinding general laws out of a large collection
of facts'.9 The point is that his mind is simply a device to extract theory from
fact, without any input of intelligence and imagination, bias or prejudice. He
wishes simply to mirror what he has secn. That is the pose Darwin the scientist
wants to strike; it is the pose he has to strike to counter accusations of a lack
of objectivity.
The very texture and structure of the book assert the same message. Darwin
adopts the ultimate defence against charges of authorial subjectivity, which
might be termed the defence ex morle. Having cast away self from science, he
casts it away even from his life story: 'I have attempted', Darwin begins, 'to
write the following account of myself as if 1were a dead man in another world
looking back at my own life'. to This, I would argue, is not a morbid impulse
but a scientific one. The particular historical circumstances in which non-
physical scicntisL<; approached their autobiography in the nineteenth century
prompted them instead to write their own obituaries.
Ideological Underpinnings
In examining the status of the scientific memoir in the nineteenth century, it
may be useful to consider the social and ideological contexts of biography in
this period. Gareth Stedman Jones, in a passage of considerable insight, sheds
light on the biographical emphasis in historical writing during the Victorian
em:
At this time [in the 1860s]the main defining characteristic of academic history
was devoutlibcralism buttressed by a positivist methodology. The task of the
historian. in Ranke's much quoted dictum, was 'simply to show how it really
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was' - in other words to ascertain lhe facts ... In placeofdangerously speculative
and scientifically unfounded general laws. lhe British historians substituted
magisterial moral judgements.... 'Facts' were events, and events resulted from
lhe actions of individuals producing them through the framework of institu-
tions. All lhese were verifiable empirical realities. and once they had been
established and confirmed. it was lhe task and duty of lhe historian to judge
lhem. It was probably for this reason that so much history was focussed upon
the Constitution and upon 'great men'. For non-sensible realities like class.
mode of production or politically and culturally determined patterns of behav-
iour were not empirically verifiable. They could not simply be uncovered by
the study of documenl~, and lhey did not afford lhe same straightforward
criterion of moral pronouncement. Thus history was more conveniently inter-
preted as lhe interaction betwccn great men and lhe institutions they created,
modified, or resisted. 11
In Britain, this viewpoint was most influentially proclaimed and practised by
Thomas Carlyle. whose dictum 'The history of the world is but the biography
of great men' became a Victorian platitude. In America, Emerson was saying
virtually the same thing - but for different reasons. The importance of 'great
men' in England was hero-worship, whereas Emerson and the American
transcendentalists sought a 'democratic cult of greatness' celebrating great
men as representatives of the masses. Both were versions of romanticism
offering reassurance in the face of industriali7.ation which tended to erase
individuality and individual control of personal destiny.
The concept of biography as an instrument of edification was pervasive.
Once again religious narratives became popular, as did 'prudential' utilitarian
examplcsofthe 'literature ofsuccess', which recounted how the new industrial
bourgeoisie had got where they were. These books served as a powerful
propaganda machine for Victorian middle-class principles. Samuel Smiles, in
his Self Ile/p, (published in 1859), refers to them like this:
British biography is studded over. as 'with patines of bright gold', with
illustrious examples of lhe power of self-help, of patient purpose, resolute
working and steadfast integrity, issuing in the formation of truly noble and
manly character: exhibiting, in language not to be misunderstood, that it is in
lhe power of each to accomplish for himself; and illustrating the efficacy of
self-respect and self-reliance in enabling men of even the humblest rank to
work out for lhemselves an honourable competency and a solid reputation.12
Less explicitly bound up with the aimsoJreligious parties or social classes was
a third kind of popular biography, inspirational in a different way: biographies
that stressed the heroism of overcoming handicaps rather than actual attain-
ment of fame or fortune.
Biography was increasingly expected to serve as an alternative popular
entertainment to novel-reading, considered immoral in some quarters, particu-
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larty before mid-century. In America too the struggle to develop an indigenous
literature encouraged a focus on individual, national heroes, both in fiction and
in popular biography. Narrative biographies, though 'truthful' (as opposed to
the 'untruthfulness' of imaginative literature), used such fictional devices as
suspense, dramatic scenes and poetically described backgrounds, and sought
to provide the same vicarious pleasures as fiction while illustrating morality
through specific cases. Biography in America wa~ also an instrument for
'democratic' self-improvement.
In the nineteenth century, then, biography was at its apex as an ideological
instrument in the service of liberal historiography, with its beliefs in the
uniqueness of events, in the free will and moral responsibility of individuals,
in historical progress and its reliance on the role and testimony of individual
men and women. The emergence of developed capitalism, with its character-
istic economic relations whereby individual men and women are 'free' to sell
their own labour power or to buy that of others. required a philosophical
definition of men and women as separate and autonomous individuals, a
philosophy reinforced and fortified by the promotion of popular biography.
By and large. the autobiographies of two very different scientists, Sigmund
Freud and Albert Einstein. bear out these observations.
Freud's Professional Life
The circumstances of an autobiography's composition often suggest some-
thing of the author's purpose in writing it, and therefore of what we may expect
to find. Our expectations are important, because they are part of the ground
against which we search for figures of significance. An Autobiographical
Study was first published in 1925, when Freud was almost 70. in a series of
short works intended 'to give a picture of the present state of medicine as
revealed in the autobiographies of its leaders'.13 The circumstances, then, are
clearly professional, and the work follows suit. After a few short and relatively
maller-of-fact pages on his birth and family background, Freud begins the
history of psychoanalysis that occupies the rest of the narrative.
An Autobiographical Study gives us a comprehensive history of Freud's
work, thought processes. and promotion of his ideas. It is a masterful job -clear,
condensed. and entirely accessible to the non-medical reader - but completely
devoted to his professional life. What little Freud tells us about his youth is pre-
professional in nature. focused on the events and personal traits that led him to
his life's work. He tells us, for instance. that the experience of anti-Semitism
increased his independence of judgment, and that his curiosity was 'directed
more towards human concerns than towards natural objects'14 - prefiguring his
later professional move from physiology to psychology.
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Aside from what it leaves out, we find the most interesting aspect of the
autobiography to be the postscript Freud added to the second American edition
in 1935. The ostensible purpose of this seven-page note is to summarise his
own work and other developments in psychoanalysis in the decade since
publication of the first edition. This Freud does with his usual clarity and
conciseness. First, however, he makes several strong but ambiguous com-
ments on the relation between life and career in the body ofthe autobiography:
Two themes rWi through these pages: the story of my life and the history of
psycho-analysis. They are intimately interwoven.This Autobiographical Study
shows how psycho-analysis came to be the whole content ofmy life and rightly
assumes that no personal experiences of mine are of any interest in comparison
to my relations wi th that science. I~
It is far from clear what Freud is saying about his pcrsonaI life in these three
statements. When he tells us that the story of his life and the history of
psychoanalysis are' intimately interwoven', he seems to mean his professional
life; there is virtually no personal life in the book. His second observation,
however, changes the metaphor, and sheds doubt on the natural interpretation
of the first: 'Psychoanalysis came to be the whole content of my life'.
Psychoanalysis displaced everything else, apparently, but was its 'container'
the professional life or the whole life? Freud's third remark furthers the
confusion. His reference to 'pcrsonal experience' suggests that in the second
sentence too he was referring to his whole life - in other words, that his whole
life consisted of psychoanalysis. It is not possible to untangle the threads of
truth and self-justification (and evasiveness?) in such a remark. Taken at face
value, it could exemplify either the confusion oflife with professional role that
Nietzsche deplored as an outgrowth of industrialization, or the rejection of
personal life that Holton attributed to the style of science.
Several pages later Freud abruptly breaks away from his task to address
once more the question of the personal life:
And here I may be allowed to break offthese autobiographical notes. The public
has no claim to learn any more of my personal affairs - of my struggles, my
disappointments, and my successes. I have in any case been more open and
frank in some of my writings (such as The Inlerpretation ofDreams and The
Psychopathology ofEveryday /.-ife) than people usually are who describe their
lives forcontemporariesOT for posterity. Ihave had small thanks for it, and from
my experience I cannot recommend anyone to follow my example. 16
Freud thus shuts the door on public curiosity about his pcrsonal life - not
because he had none, but becauseearl ier revelations had broughthim grief. The
world had been eager, naturally enough, to learn the secrets of the man who
invented psychoanalysis, but Freud had discovered that readers were less
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understanding than analysts. The tension one feels behind Freud's testiness
may have contributed to the uncharacteristic confusion of his earlier remarks.
In a more generic statement on writing about lives, Freud's style is more
energetic and his assertions more dogmatic:
Whoever undertakes to writc a biography binds himself to lying, to conceal-
ment, to nummery, and evcn to hiding his own lack of understanding, since
biographical material is not to be had, and if it were it could not be used. Truth
is not acccssible; mankind docs not deservc it, and wasn't Prince Hamlet right
whcn hc askcd who would cscape a whipping "if he had his desens?11
The truth cannot be known; the world is not good enough for it, and besides,
the truth is bad: a strange, even defensive, series of statements from the father
of psychoanalysis. As Lewis Mumford nOles, with reference to the above
passage, psychoanalysis is 'nothing less than the act ofautobiography' carried
to an exhaustive and painful extreme forthe sake of self-knowledge. Freud left
the world a fine professional autobiography; a combination of editorial
expectntions and his own exacerbated desire for privacy apparently discour-
aged him from incorporating into it the history of his wider life, his self, in
Freudian or any other style.
Einstein: The 'I' in Science?
Albert Einstein's Autobiographical Notes, published in 1949 when Einstein
was 70, also came into being through the persuasion of an editor - 'quite some
persuasion' according to the editor, in his preface to the 1979 anniversary
edition. The book was to be an intellectual autobiography for the Library of
Living Philosophers series. If the editor had been looking for more, he might
have been discouraged by a short piece entitled'Sci f-Portrait,' written in 1936,
in which Einstein declared his lack of interest in the emotional tangle of sclf-
knowledge:
Of what is significant in onc's own existcncc one is hardly aware, and it
ccrtainly should not bother the other fellow. What does a fish know about the
water in which he swims all his life?
The bitter and the sweet come from the outside, the hard from within. from
one's own efforts. For the most part I do the thing which my own nature drives
mc to do. It is embarrassing to earn so much respect and love for it. Arrows of
hate have been shot at me too; but they never hit me, because somchow thcy
belongcd to anothcr world, with which I have no connection whatsoever.
I live in that solitude which is painful in youth, but delicious in the years of
maturity.11
Unsurprisingly, most of Autobiographical NOles has to do with physics. In
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fact, with the exception ofan occasional sentence or two, all but the first seven
pages of the 44-page work are virtually inscrutable to the non-mathematical
reader. Yet Einstein writes tellingly on certain personal themes in the opening
pages. We learn, in summary fashion, of his precocious disillusionment with
'the hopcs and strivings that chase most mcn restlcssly through life,' and of thc
'deep rcligiousncss' which was a tcmpomry balm for that disappointmcnt. His
reading of popular scicntific books Icd to a loss of rcligious faith and a
'positivcly fanatic [orgy 011 frccthinking,' and finally to a life-long 'sceptical
attitudc toward thc convictions that wcre alivc in any specific social environ-
ment' - an attitudc that may well have contributed to thc originality of
Einstcin's scientific work.
Here and later, Einstcin identifics as the major goal of his life escape from
the transitory into thc realm of abstractions and dcpendable relations. Of his
first rcligious yearnings, he says: 'it is quite clear to me that the religious
paradise of youth, which wa<; thus lost [at age 12), was a first attempt to free
myself from thcchainsofthc"mcrely-personal", from an existence dominated
by wishcs, hopes and primitive fcelings.' Thc young Einstcin had noticed that
'many a man whom I had learncd to estccm and to admirc had found inner
freedom and security' in the pursuit of thc 'great, cternal riddle' of nature. The
men who had sought this freedom 'were the friends who could not be lost.'
Einstein broadly dcfines his self as intellectual, rathcr than emotional or
expericntial: 'The esscntial being ofa man of my type lies precisely in what he
thinks and how he thinks, not in what he docs or suffers.' 19
Einstein's closing statement, the last sentence of Autobiographical Notes~
expresses his awareness that readers of autobiographies expect comprehen-
sivencss and coherence in the presentation of a life:
This exposition has fullillcd its purpose if it shows the reader how the efforts
ofa life hang together and why they have led to expcct3tionsofadelinitc form.20
Indeed, Einstein fulfills his purpose extraordinarily well, considering how
little space he devotes to personal matters. Better than either Darwin or Freud,
Einstein gives us a portrait of his essential self, of the centml drive of his life
and of how, in the broadest terms, it was played out in his scientific career.
Thus, while Einstcin is no more inclined than Darwin or Freud to give us
intimate details from his personal life, rcticence seems richer in Einstein
because hc has explicitly linked that quality with the essence of his self.
Einstcin's rcfusal to tell us more about himself has a flavour entirely
diffcrcntto Freud's. Whilc Freud seems to be struggling with issues of self,
Einstcin appears above it all, having transccndcd the self. We arc tcmpted to
say that Einstein offers his readcrs the bare bones of a 'transpersonal' self, a
personality that found fulfilmcnt in a realm of thinking located outside the
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traditional literary (or Freudian) personality. The tenn transpersonal is nor-
mally used to refer to a spiritual experience of union with a suprapersonal
reality. Einstein's immersion in the contemplative realm of theoretical phys-
ics, especially when combined with his essentially religious reverence for the
order of the cosmos, makes a surprisingly good fit.
Concluding Remarks
When the topic is as idiosyncratic as that of autobiography, and the sample is
small, it is probably best to restrict one's closing remarks to observations about
individual works.
To begin with, there is that Pandora's Box of autobiographical criticism,
the nature of self. Docs one take only what the narrator offers, and that at face
value? Interpretation seems unavoidable, but it introduces major uncertainties.
What is it, in eithcr casc, that we are searching for? A Freudian self? (That
would certainly doom poor Darwin to naivete!) A behaviourist self (whatever
that might be)? Jungian? How should we decide? We have treated the question
ofself in thisarticlequitcsimply, perhaps simplistically at times, since we have
been trying to explore another set of questions.
In examining works of intrinsic interest, by writers with lives of uncharac-
teristically great intcrest, we now see that we have no hope of testing
Chargaff's claim that scientific autobiographies are dull because scientists'
lives are uninteresting. What we may do is to consider afresh our earlier claim
that self-effacing scientific autobiography is the product of a particular era.
The three autobiographies discussed in this article represent different periods,
and it might be justifiable to suggest- with suitable caveats about their fields
of study - that their different motivations for self-effacement indicate a
gradual weakening of the original rationales for avoiding the personal. In other
words, Darwin's motivation resembles Huxley's-noltoundermine,ordraw
attention away from, the science. Freud's motivation was similar, and his
uncharacteristic confusion and ambivalence probably arose from the inherent
contradiction that his work asserted the supremacy of the personal life. Thus
a rationale similarlo Darwin's was particularly weak and tortured coming from
him. A quarter of a century later, with Einstein, it was no longer a question of
tainting the science with the personal; instead, the pursuit of science was
explained as a method of transcending the merely personal. This is an
essentially personal way of avoiding the personal, and leaves plenty of room
for other scientisL'> with different psychologies to write more reflectively or
reminisce critically.
Darwin wrote his life for his family; Freud and Einstein wrote theirs for
series whose slants were professional or intellectual. If life stories written
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under such auspices lack personal interest, that facet is attributable to the
values of the profession rather than to suppression or confusion on the pan of
the individual scientist- even if there is overlap between the dispositions of the
profession and the scientist trained in it. Freud's harried ambivalence seems to
bear out the point. He slimy denies us his personal life in his professional
autobiography, but informs us in an aside where we can go to find what he had
left out
About the existence of a 'scientific self', we are reluctant to generalise.
Einstein's withdrawn or transpersonal self, Darwin's post-mortem,and Freud's
public self, each match one or other of Hollon's specifications for scientific
style, and would seem to be good starting-points for further study.
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